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The opportune scholarly moment has arrived for empirical
scholarship in contract law. Exhortations to do empirical work have
long resounded through the academy, at least since the time of the
Legal Realists, but as is often observed, the Realists accomplished little
of the kind of empirical work that they had in mind, or of the kind we
mean when we speak of empiricism (a definitional point that will be
taken up shortly). 1 Not until the pioneering work of Professor Stewart
Macaulay, as well as Professor Lawrence Friedman and others of the
Wisconsin School, did empirical work get off the ground in an
important way, at least as far as contracts are concemed.2 And aside
*
Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law; Chair, Section on Contracts,
Association of American Law Schools (2005-2006). All of the papers published here were
first presented at the annual meeting of the AALS Section on Contracts on January 6, 2006,
in Washington, D.C. I would like to thank all of the participants in the symposium and the
editors of the Tulane Law Review for their extraordinary efforts in making this symposium
happen without so much as a hiccup, despite the worst natural disaster in the history of the
nation, a change of venue of more than 1000 miles, and a rearrangement of the schedule. I
owe particular gratitude to Stewart Macaulay for his comments on a draft, and I would also
like to acknowledge the extremely able research assistance of Jamie L. Walter.
1.
See WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 39
(1973); Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism and Improving the Navigation of
The Yellow Submarine, 80 TuL. L. REv. 1159 (2006).
2.
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 55-67 (1963) (using empirical methodology to examine the use
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from the work of the Wisconsin School, the law reviews for many
years continued their long record of purity, largely unsullied by
empiricism. In recent years, though, the pages have gained texture
from empirical work, and there is now certainly enough of it to warrant
a gathering devoted to empirical scholarship in contract law.
My role in this symposium, as well as the role of these
introductory reflections, is adventurous. I am no empiricist. Yet nearly
all scholars of contract law are inevitably interested in empirical work
on the subject, and nearly all of us are consumers of empirical
scholarship. We read it and are informed by it. Our views are shaped
by it. Our classes and writings reflect it. With more careful study and
closer thought, however, we may find that we are less reliably
informed than we think, and we are correspondingly in greater need of
more work done with greater rigor. The reflections that follow are
those of a consumer of empiricism, and they are directed at fellow
consumers as well as those who offer empirical work. These
ruminations are centered on three points:
what we mean by
empincism, how we may be misled by failures to adhere to established
rules of inference, and why we must be wary of pinning too much on
scientific appearances.
The necessary starting point is definitional, and it is surprisingly
convoluted. The word empiric and its various forms have long carried
4
connotations of the worst kind of pseudo-science. For a long time, a
practitioner of empiricism was, by definition, "a quack" or "[a]
pretender, impostor, [or] charlatan."5 This meaning seems to come
from a school of medical and scientific thought that eschewed theory
and based its practices solely on observation, experience, or
experiment. 6 Whatever ancient patina (through an association with the
Greek sect of EµnezpzKoz) might otherwise have lent respectability to
empirical practices seems largely to have dissipated in the usage of
Renaissance and early Modern times. 1 Instead, empiricists were the

of contracts in exchange relationships); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 3, 9-13 (1965) (analyzing over 500
Wisconsin contract cases in order to explore the relationship between contract law and
societal institutions).
3.
See Symposium, The Relevance ofContract Theory, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 803.
4.
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 188 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "empiric").

5.
6.
7.

Id
See id.
See id.
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sort of quack physicians so well known, even now, to all contracts
scholars-and probably most contracts students. 8
Certainly this sort of definition is more than a little uncongenial
for a symposium devoted to empirical scholarship, and obviously the
word has somehow been rehabilitated, becoming not only respectable
but scholarly, and perhaps even scientific. I will not pretend to know
how this change occurred, but an apparent correlation may be
observed: the negative connotation of empiricism disappeared along
with the empiricists' disdain for theory.
Indeed, much legal
scholarship is both theoretical or doctrinal as well as empirical.9
Perhaps this coupling of empirical observation with theoretical
thinking or doctrinal analysis helps to rescue empiricism from
quackery, or irrelevance.
A further etymological observation may help us further
understand the role of empiricism in today's scholarship. Beyond
its association with the Eµnt:1p1Koi, the word is related to f.µnt:zpia,
or experience. 10 At a time when long experience in practice is
often eschewed by legal academia, empirical research allows the
academy a different, more scientific form of experience. Lacking
years of courtroom argument or contract negotiation, scholars
nonetheless hope-and need-to know what is happening outside
the stone walls of the law school. Empirical work, done properly,
can help to fill that need, and in some ways it can do so in a way
that is more reliable than first-hand experience. Experienced
experts can explain, on their own authority, what has happened in
their experience, and if they enjoy long experience and expertise,
they may well assume and assert that practice elsewhere is the
same as in their bailiwick. Empirical digging is necessary to verify
these assertions, and the digging often shows that practice is more
varied than the expert disclosed, or even knew. 11 In addition, the
reach for empiricism fits with the push away from professional
training and the pull toward the sort of scholarship valued in the
nonprofessional departments of the university. This point will
arise again later.
8.
See Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., (1892) I Q.B. 256 (Eng. Ct. App.);
A.W.B. Simpson, Quackery and Contract Law: The Case ofthe Carbolic Smoke Ball, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 345, 345 (1985).
9.
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules oflnference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 3-6
(2002).
I 0.
See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 188.
11.
See James J. White, The InDuence of Intemational Practice on the Revision of
Article5 ofthe
16 Nw. J. INT'LL.&Bus. 189, 213 (1995).

ucc,
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Etymological discursus notwithstanding, delving into the
dictionary has yet to disclose the kind of definition that seems
comfortable in the legal academic setting. Many legal academics are
referring to statistical or other quantitative analysis when they discuss
empirical scholarship, 12 but the endeavor is broader. 13 Professors Lee
Epstein and Gary King offer the following definition, noting that it
includes quantitative and qualitative work: "The word 'empirical'
denotes evidence about the world based on observation or
experience." 14 Empiddsm, they say, is simply about "basing conclusions
on observation or experimentation." 15 Their article, still relatively
recent, is probably the most authoritative guide to empirical work for
legal scholars, and it aims to bring the rigor of the sciences into the
legal academy. 16 The core of the definition--observation, experience,
or experiment-resonates reasonably well with the sort of work that
contracts scholars often mean when they speak of empiricism, and the
remainder of this Article will take Professors Epstein and King's
definition as authoritative.
As a mere consumer of empirical work, I am hardly in a position
to criticize these masters. Yet a reader and consumer may still observe
that their definition includes a term that they importantly
recharacterize later in the article. 11 To be empirical, they say, the
evidence must be "about the world." 18 In this form, the phrase seems
to carry little meaning, as there is little that is not in some way "about
the world." 19 Even most theory has to do with the world in one way or
another. Still, Professors Epstein and King are driving at a significant
point that comes out when they rephrase and speak repeatedly of the
"realworld."20 They seem hesitant to use the phrase formally, but their
urge to link empiricism with the real world is the best instinct. It again
brings back the Legal Realists.
12.
See Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807,
810 (1999); Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship: Reestablishing a Dialogue
Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 347, 349 (1995); Peter H.
Schuck, J.Wiy Don't Law Professors Do More Empin'cal Research?, 39 J. LEGAL Eouc. 323,
323 (1989).
13.
Epstein & King, supra note 9, at 2-3.
14.
Id at 2; see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 189 (providing a
second definition of empin'callyas "[b ]y means of observation and experiment").
15.
Epstein & King, supra note 9, at 2.
16.
Seeidatl-2.
17.
Seeidat2.
18.
Seeid
19.
Seeid
20.
Id passim (emphasis added).

2006]

EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP

1013

In their efforts to free the law from what they considered an arid
conceptualism, the Realists suggested an antidote that might be
summed up by a slogan: Go out and look. This idea, I would suggest,
is at the heart of the sort of work that contracts scholars would identify
as empirical. The slogan includes the point that empiricism may be
qualitative as well as quantitative, and that the answer to what is often
called "an empirical question" need not involve any numbers, much
less sophisticated statistical analysis or learned use of Greek letters.
(The reverse is true as well: the presence of numbers and Greek letters
does not make an article empirical. These reflections are indeed a case
in point.)
At the same time, the thirst to know what may be learned from
going out and looking is slaked only unsatisfactorily by pulling case
reporters from the library shelves or running searches through Westlaw
or Lexis. In understanding the sort of empiricism that I am arguing
for, I would like to begin with three nonrigorous suggestions:
1.
2.
3.

Judicial case analysis does not seem empirical.
Quantitative analysis is not necessarily empirical.
Empirical scholarship must have to do with a world that we
are willing to call "real."

To begin with the first proposition, consider a hypothetical article
about a single Supreme Court case, say, Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute. 21 Assume the article dissects the majority opinion and predicts
the implications for future doctrine. The article considers the dissent
and places the entire case in the context of preceding cases, statutes,
and scholarship. It is a thoroughly done piece, useful, and perhaps
important. It does not seem empirical; most contracts scholars would
not refer to it as a new empirical article on contracts of adhesion,
unconscionability, forum selection clauses, or anything else. This
description would still hold even if the article includes a copy of the
cruise ticket as it is reproduced by Justice Stevens. 22 The article would
need something more to be considered empirical: the author would
have to go out and look at something, and he would need to look at
something other than cases, statutes, and articles.
For the same reason, a quantitative statistical analysis of the case
law would make the article no more empirical. Suppose the author
surveyed all cases weighing the unconscionability of forum selection
clauses. The cases are coded for purposes of statistical analysis and
21.
22.

499 U.S. 585 (1991).
See id at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1014

TULANE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80: 1009

reported in tabular form (similar to the work on promissory estoppel
by Professor Robert Hillman, some of whose tables appear in Figure 1
to help give a flavor of the kind of statistical summary that is
involved). 23 This work would make the article more useful, and more
important, but it is no more empirical for having used either numbers
or statistical techniques. While this view may be controversial,
particularly given current usage within the legal academy,24 it can in
fact be defended rigorously, based on the King and Epstein definition
25
that we have taken as authoritative. Similarly, an article is no less
empirical for stressing qualitative factors. 26
Thus the second
proposition holds, even under careful assessment.
FIGURE 1

Table 1.3 21
Win Rate of Promissory Estoppel Claims on the Merits-Trial Courts
Promissory Estoppel
Claims"'
Comparison: Win Rates
for Contract Claims in
Federal District Court
65
Cases

Plaintiff Wins
N
(%)
(5.45)
6
14,308

(54.77)

Plaintiff Loses
N
(%)
104
(94.55)
11,818

(45.23)

Total
110
26,126

"These state trial court and federal district court claims from the data were successful or failed on the merits,
as defined supra.
65
These data are derived from a "database ofabout 3.7 million federal district court civil cases terminated over
the last 17 fiscal years. The data were gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the Inter-university Consortium for Political
and Social Research." Quoting from the Internet at <http://teddy.law.cornell.edu:8090/questcv2.htm> (visited
Feb. 3, 1998) (on file with the Columbia Law RevieW) where the data is available. The plaintiff win rate
reported in this Table is for all types of contract cases terminated in federal district courts during fiscal years
1990-1994 (July 1, 1989 through September 30, 1994) for which the method of disposition was a pre-trial
motion, jury verdict, directed verdict, or non-jury trial. Cases that were disposed of by default judgment or
consent judgment are not included.

23.
See Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory
Estoppel- An Empincal and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 580, this. 1.3, 2.1-.2
(1998).
24.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (citing Heise, Nard, and Schuck).
25.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
26.
See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is
Promissory Estoppel Really as Unsuccess!Ul as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data,
37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 531, 584-85 (2002) (recognizing the importance of qualitative
judgments in understanding winlloss rates); cf. Sidney W DeLong, The New Requirement of
En!Orcement Reliance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997
Wis. L. REv. 943, 943 (discussing judicial receptivity to commercial actors' efforts to
minimize liability based on promissory estoppel).
27.
Hillman, supra note 23, at 591.
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Table 2.1 28
Win Rates of Promissory Estoppel Claims by Subject MatterOutcome of Cases Decided on the Merits
Subject Matter of
Dispute
Employment
Construction
Sale of Real Property
Lease of Real Property
Loaning ofFunds
Sale of Goods
Sale of Intangibles
Lease of Eauipment
Promissory Note
Other
Unclear
Total

PE claim succeeded on the merits
(%)
N
(4.23)
6
2
(22.22)
1
(10.00)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
4
(22.22)
0
(0.00)
1
(33.33)
0
(0.00)
(16.85)
15
0
(0.00)
29
(9.70)

Total
142
9
10
4
13
18
4
3
5
89
2
299

Table 2.229
Win Rates of Promissory Estoppel Claims in Which Subject Matter
Was Employment-Outcome of Cases Decided on the Merits
Subject Matter of Dispute
Emplovment
All Other Subject Matter
Total

PE claim succeeded on the merits
N
(%)
6
(4.23)
23
(14.65)
(9.70)
29

Total
142
157
299

Fisher's exact test (2-sided) p = 0.003
The only point of this argument that cannot be defended
rigorously is the first and seemingly most obvious piece: that a simple
case note is not empirical. Whether that case note merits the adjective
"empirical" turns on what we consider to be the "world" for purposes
of empirical research. If the library and the Supreme Court are part of
the world-and in some way, surely they must be-then the case note
is empirical scholarship. 30 In fact, so is Professor Hillman's work
debunking the new consensus on promissory estoppel. 31 And both, as
is important below, are subject to the rules of inference. 32 Again,

28.
Id at 593.
29.
Id
30. This point was made at the live symposium by Professor Richard Owen Lempert
of the University of Michigan. Richard Owen Lempert, Remarks at the Association of
American Law Schools Annual Meeting, Panel on Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law
(Jan. 6, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.aals.org/arn2006/program/Friday.html).
31.
See Hillman, supra note 23, at 582, 595-96.
32.
See Epstein & King, supra note 9, at 2.
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though, Professor Hillman's work is no more empirical just because it
uses statistical analysis.
The urge that prompted the Realists to want to go out and look,
which is perhaps the same urge that prompts Professors Epstein and
King to refer to the "real world," indicates a desire and need to know
more about what happens in matters that are not reflected within the
library of the law school or the computer in each faculty office. The
intellectual history of contract scholarship suggests that this urge to go
out and look needs encouragement wherever possible. Focusing the
current interest in empiricism on the world outside the law schools and
the appellate courts could lead to much-needed illumination-light
that could and should be put to use in the practical and important work
done by lawyers, law professors, and judges. 33
Note that the argument that empirical work is about going out
and looking is not an argument about what is important. Although
they did not do it much, some of the Realists did go out and look a bit.
Possibly they were na"ive; in any event, some of their labor appears
remarkably unimportant though perfectly empirical.
Underhill
Moore's studies of parking in New Haven are perhaps the most famous
example, "a symbol of the ridiculous and expensive pursuit of trivia by
the highly talented."34 Similarly, unempirical work can be of immense
utility and importance, taking as an example much of the work of the
late Professor E. Allan Farnsworth. 35 When we say that work is
empirical we mean that it undertakes something beyond the doctrinal
or the theoretical, and that different aspect is what these reflections aim
to highlight. It turns out to be, I think, the need to go out, look, and
report back.
The other two points of these reflections can be made more
briefly. The first is the need for care when doing or using empirical
research. Because so many of us without training in science or social
science nevertheless need to use the fruits of empirical work, it is easy
both to miss the flaws that make some empirical work unreliable, and
33.
Though technically outside the field of contract law, Professor White's lament
about the drafting of revised article 5 (Letters of Credit) of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) without the benefit of empirical knowledge illustrates the point nicely, and the same
point could be made with respect to much of the drafting that is even closer to the contracts
field, such as the amendments to UCC article 2 (Sales). See White, supra note 11, at 189,
211-13.
34.
TWINING, supra note 1, at 63, 65-66.
35.
For example, the following works are unempirical in the sense used here, but
nonetheless important: E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2004); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGREITED DECISIONS ( 1998).
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it is just as easy to misuse or misunderstand perfectly good empirical
scholarship. Fortunately, a solution to this problem is readily available.
In The Rules of Inference, Professors Epstein and King take on the
task of educating the legal academy on the rules to be followed. 36 In
this regard, the widest definition of empiricism is necessary, for almost
all legal research is subject to at least some of the rules of inference.
Indeed, in that sense we have all been doing empirical research, though
we may be just as surprised as M. Jourdain was to discover that he had
been speaking prose for forty years without knowing it.37 Now that we
know it, we can do so more consciously, with some awareness of the
rules, and with an effort to distinguish the good from the bad. 38
Professor Epstein and King's article is not only crucial reading
for both producers and consumers of empirical research, it is easily
accessible. True, it is long. But the basic points can be gleaned
quickly. The length of the article comes from the many examples of
missteps in the legal literature.39 The authors explain the rules and their
significance in language that is clear even for untutored law professors.
While the rules and principles are easy to understand once they are
explained, they are not all obvious, and it is a mistake to assume that
common sense is enough to evaluate whether and how to rely on
empirical scholarship. Without considering the arguments that arise
from their piece (or similar learning), we are doomed to repeat the
nearly constant errors that Professors Epstein and King have found.
Without due care, these mistakes will pervade our thinking everyday,
from basic conceptions about the way the world of contracting works
to what we teach in the classroom.
The third and final point is a cautionary musing about the
American legal academy: the current popularity of empirical research
and seductive quantifications is a striking parallel to the nineteenthcentury idea of legal science, as well as various reprises of that
perennial yearning.40 The stereotypical image of a Langdellian legal
36.
See Epstein & King, supra note 9.
3 7.
See JEAN-BAPTISTE POQUELIN (MOLIERE), LE BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME act 2, SC.
4 (Claude K. Abraham ed., Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1966) (1670) ("Par ma foil il ya plus de
quarante ans que je dis de la prose sans que}'en susse den . ...").
38.
Curiously, Grant Gilmore made this very observation. GRANT GILMORE, THE
DEATH OF CONTRACT 5-6 (1974) ("Once it has been revealed to us that it is really prose that
we are speaking, we immediately become concerned about a theory of language, about rules
of grammar and syntax, about differentiating good usage from bad.").
39.
See Epstein & King, supra note 9, passim.
40.
Certainly the most amusing account is GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 41-67 (1977) (noting the scientific impact on American Law prior to World War I,
specifically influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell and his contemporaries).
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scholar working "in much the way that a scientist discovers scientific
principles" has now been largely discredited, even if we still feel the
same pull that Langdell did to prove the worth of legal scholarship in
the context of a university.41 Even scholars as early as Williston
recognized that these scientific, purely deductive, and almost
Euclidean pretensions at science were troubled, and the shortcomings
of that approach are even more apparent now. 42
No doubt the current moves toward empiricism are better placed
than the now-discredited ones, with better qualified scholars working
with more sophisticated methods. Nevertheless, an outsider might still
wonder if he observes the same straining that Williston identified
when he reacted to the previous generation's conceptions of legal
science:
Law is a science but it is a pragmatic science. It can rarely deal with the
absolute. Questions of how far and how much constantly intrude, and
the questions of degree thus introduced require for their solution
determination of doubtful facts and comparative valuing of interests,
which have no mathematical equivalents.43
That lesson is a hard one to learn. The lesson includes the limits of
scientific approaches, the dangers of their illusions of certainty, and the
merits of less scientific inquiries. 44 Langdell taught us much, and gave
us much.45 That experience has clarified the shortcomings of this
method and the misguided nature of his scientific aspirations does not
make his work useless. On the other hand, if we fail to see some of the
same scientific aspirations in current empirical scholarship, and feel
not enough of a twinge of recognition to require care before we pin too
much on legal scientific aspirations, then we have indeed failed to
learn from Langdell, or from Williston, much less Corbin and the
Realists.
That we cannot pin the world on empiricism, though, hardly takes
away anything real. Empirical scholarship is full of insight and
41. W. Burlette Carter, Reconstructing Langdell, 32 GA. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1997); see,
e.g., Dennis Patterson, Langdel/'s Legacy, 90 Nw. L. REV. 196, 196 (1995).
42.
See SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 202 (1940).
43. Id
44. On the last point, see Professor Macaulay's contribution to this symposium, as
noted supra note I.
45. Observing Holmes's citations to Langdell is an interesting exercise in itself;
Holmes certainly knew both the use and the limits of Langdell's work. See, e.g., O.W.
HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 286, 305-06, 335 (1881); see a/so Patterson, supra note 41.
For a more critical view, see John Henry Schlegel, Langdell's Legacy or, The Case of the
Empty Envelope, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1517 (1984) (reviewing ROBERT B. STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850s TO THE 1980s (1983)).

2006]

EMPIRICAL SCHOLARSHIP

1019

learning for all teachers and scholars of contract law, and the present
papers are fine examples. The study presented here by Stephen Choi
and Mitu Gulati may come from a rarefied stratum of the contracts
world, but it raises immediate questions for contracts scholars and
teachers. 46 The data come from sovereign debt contracts-in other
words, government bonds. These contracts for enormous loans,
starting in the hundreds of millions of dollars, can and do support
expensive, elite lawyering. They are also subject to elaborate
disclosure rules promulgated by the SEC. Yet empirical investigation
shows that the actual disclosures made in the real world are topsyturvy, with issuers uselessly disclosing well-known information that
may not even need to be mentioned, but failing to disclose more
important information, even though this failure may well violate the
securities laws. 47 Even more curiously, the empirical findings do not
suggest that issuers are hiding damaging information while touting the
encouraging points.
More likely, these expensively lawyered
transactions seem simply to be following the practices perceived as
usual in the marketplace, a seeming network effect that is leading to
systematically unbalanced disclosures. 48 For contracts teachers who
must take on the slippery problems associated with duties to disclose,49
there are important lessons here, most pointedly about the questionable
efficacy of imposing rules. If the SEC cannot achieve optimal
disclosure, can the common law?
George Geis takes on a different common law issue in his article:
the optimal precision of default rules. 50 Would it be better to have
different default rules for different contexts, or the same simple default
for all? In his inquiry, he takes on Hadley v. Baxendale,51 the typical
testing ground for default rule research, and asks whether the law
might do better to have different default rules for different kinds of
contracts. To answer this question, he uses rigorously collected and
analyzed marketing data to create computerized simulations of
"sample economies." The article tests whether a single, simple default
rule would work better than a more complex "compound default rule"
46.
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure
Practice, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023 (2006).
47.
Id at 1062.
48. Id at 1068.
49.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFCONTRACTS §§ 160-161 (1981); see also id
§ 153 (unilateral mistake).
50. George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract DefiJult
Rules, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1109 (2006).
51. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exch. 1854) (Alderson, B.).
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that is more sensitive to context. The method itself is particularly
intriguing, as it shows how the rich world of marketing data can be
used in contracts scholarship. The method also has the benefit of
showing how Baron Alderson's opinion works when it meets a digital
music player, an autologous blood donation, or the quotidian travel
mug, among other things.
A symposium on empirical legal scholarship would not be
complete without Professor Macaulay, and his entry in this volume
calls for a new legal realism. He goes beyond the original realists in
two important ways: as already noted, he actually did empirical
scholarship,52 and more importantly for present purposes, he continues
to try to pull scholars from their accustomed place in the mandarinate,
shaded by the baroque accretions that they have added to the edifice of
appellate opinions. The "living law" or the "law in action"53 is where
Professor Macaulay wants us-studying the relational norms that hold
contracts together, 54 the deterrent effect of terroristic civil trials, 55 the
negotiation that is different for black people than for white people,56
and the functional mix of public and private lawmaking. 57 This is a
complex and resonant call, reverberating through economic, political,
and historical theory, as is demonstrated in the margins of his article.
His argument also takes on empirical theory, challenging the notion
that studies which violate one or more of the lofty rules of inference,
studies which lack a random sample, or which cannot be replicated, tell
us nothing. 58 Through all of these complexities, his call is still centered
on the urge to go out and look, 59 and then--only then-to draw a map
of contract law that is real, that will help us avoid fatal collisions, that
perhaps will keep us from getting lost. Until someone draws a better
map. 60

52. As noted supra, the original realists called for empiricism but did little, and what
they did was of questionable utility. See supra notes l, 34 and accompanying text. The
pioneering work was Macaulay, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
53. See Macaulay, supra note l,passim.
54. ldat 1169, 1180.
55. Id at 1165-67.
56. ldatll77-79.
57. ldat 1171-72.
58. Id at II82 & n.94.
59. See id. at 1183 (stating that "our best bet is to find one or more people who know
what is going on and ask them").
60.
See Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 115, 118-20 (1979) (stating that the study "should be read as a preliminary study,
offering suggestions the author thinks are true enough to warrant reliance until someone is
willing to invest enough to produce better data and lucky enough to find a way to get them").
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Debora Threedy's contribution on legal archaeology moves
empirical scholarship forward on a number of fronts. 61 Having
practiced legal archaeology with her prominent study of Alaska
62
Packers' Ass 'n v. Domemco, here she takes on several theoretical and
methodological challenges. The article helps fill the need for more
work on methodology in legal scholarship, and it advances the
argument for "grounded theorizing," in which data are used to
construct the theoretical agenda rather than the other way around. The
method is appealing as producing theory based on evidence, although
of course the true test for such theories will come as they are tested in
new settings. The article goes on to show how this process can be
achieved, and more importantly, how it can be pointedly useful rather
than simply entertaining. 63 Canvassing the existing literature in legal
archaeology, Professor Threedy shows how case studies and similar
work can expose the relation between social change and the law, as
well as the social constructions inherent in the legal process.
All of these scholars have gone out and looked. It is important
work, and we all benefit.

61. Debora L. Threedy, Legal Archaeology: Excavating Cases, Reconstructing
Context, 80 TUL. L. REv. 1195 (2006).
62.
117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902); see also Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska
Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 2000 UTAHL. REv. 185.
63.
Professor Threedy's article is responding to the objections voiced by Professor
William Twining, e.g., in Cannibalism and Legal Literature, 6 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 423, 430
(1986) (reviewingA.W BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISMANDTHECOMMONLAW (1984)).

